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COMPATIBILISM AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
Jason Turner
The free will defense is a theistic strategy for resisting the atheistic argu-
ment known as “the logical problem of evil.” It insists that God may have to 
allow some evil in order to get the greater good of creatures freely choosing 
to act rightly. Many philosophers have thought that the free will defense 
requires the truth of incompatibilism, according to which acts cannot be 
free if they are causally determined. For it seems that if compatibilism is 
true, God should be able to get the goods of free creatures acting rightly 
without any evil by simply creating a world where creatures are causally 
determined to always act rightly. I argue that this is not so. First I describe  
and motivate a compatibilist account of free will according to which,  
although God can create creatures which are both free and causally deter-
mined, the freedom of determined creatures depends on God’s not taking 
into account what they will be determined to do. I then show how, given 
such a form of compatibilism, God may be able to create free and deter- 
mined creatures without being able to create creatures determined to  
always freely act rightly.
The free will defense is a theistic strategy for rejecting a certain argument 
for the non-existence of God. The argument, sometimes called the “logical 
problem of evil,” insists that it is logically impossible for an omnipotent, 
omniscient, perfectly benevolent God to co-exist with evil. Since evil 
clearly exists, the argument goes, God does not. The free will defense re-
sponds by claiming that, since free will is very good indeed, a God with 
all the characteristics in question might co-exist with evil—provided that 
the evil was brought about by (other) free creatures and God could not 
have prevented the evil without making his creatures unfree. It is com-
monly believed that the free will defense works only if the creatures in 
question have a sort of freedom incompatible with determinism. I used to 
believe this. I now think it is wrong. There are at least some versions of 
compatibilism which can, with the help of certain plausible theses about 
what God can do, respond to the atheist’s argument with a version of the 
free will defense.
1. The Problem of Evil and the Free Will Defense
The free will defense is best seen as a tactic in one of the many skirmishes 
between the atheist and the theist. The atheist begins the skirmish by 
saying, “God, if there were one, would have to be omnipotent, omniscient, 
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and perfectly benevolent. But, necessarily, any perfectly benevolent being 
prevents any evil insofar as it is able and can foresee it. And, necessarily, 
an omniscient being could foresee all potential evil and an omnipotent 
one could eliminate all of it. So, necessarily, if God existed, there would 
be no evil: he would have prevented it. But there is clearly some evil in the 
world—someone nicked my sandwich from the office fridge this morning, 
for instance—so, by modus tollens, God does not exist.”1
The free-will defender responds, “Wait a minute. I don’t buy your 
premise that ‘any perfectly benevolent being prevents any evil insofar as 
it is able and can foresee it.’ A perfectly benevolent being may allow some 
avoidable, foreseeable evil so long as a much greater good is produced 
thereby: a perfectly benevolent doctor may allow, or even cause, the ‘evil’ 
pain of a vaccination in order to bring about the much greater good of 
prolonged life.”
“Ok, I’ll grant you your modified premise,” the atheist says. “Let it be 
said rather that, necessarily, a perfectly benevolent being prevents all evil 
within its power to foresee and prevent, unless that evil brings about a 
greater good. But, necessarily, an all-powerful being can get any of these 
supposed greater goods without relying on the evil as an intermediary: 
a doctor may have to rely on the pain of a vaccination in order to prolong 
life, but surely God can administer the vaccination without the needle.”
“Not so fast,” replies the free-will defender. “The goods God is worried 
about here are not prolonged lives but creatures making morally signifi-
cant choices to do what’s right. Such choices are very, very valuable, and 
if God needs to allow a bit of evil in order to have them, they are worth 
it. If God were to eliminate all evil, he would have to do it by keeping his 
creatures from acting evilly, which would require his taking away their 
free will. But were he to do that, they could not make morally significant 
choices and a very valuable good would be lost.”
“Certainly God knows in advance how any agent will act in a given 
circumstance,” the atheist responds. “Why can’t he just take away their 
freedom when they’re about to cause some evil, and leave it intact when 
they’re about to cause good?”
“Let’s be careful now,” the theist says. “Since God is omniscient, if an 
agent is in fact about to act wrongly, and God is not going to intervene, 
then God knows that the agent is in fact about to act wrongly. But God 
also knows that he isn’t going to intervene—so he won’t. If God is going 
to be in a position to intervene, God needs a slightly different sort of 
knowledge: he needs to know that the agent will act wrongly if he doesn’t 
intervene, and that knowledge must be independent of whether God is in 
fact going to intervene. But if God is to know this, then there must be a fact 
1My atheist is here following J. L. Mackie (“Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64 (1955): 
200–212). The theist is modeled largely on Alvin Plantinga (God, Freedom, and Evil [Grand 
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1974], 7–64, and “Self Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. J. E. 
Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen [Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985]), although his style of response 
has become ubiquitous amongst theists.
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of the matter about this conditional which is itself independent of whether 
God is going to intervene or not.
“I suspect you think God is in a position to intervene because you’re 
assuming something in the neighborhood of Molinism. Molinists think 
that, for every possible creature S, every (maximally specific) possible set 
of circumstances C, and every possible action A, either the conditional ‘If 
S were put in C, S would A’ or ‘If S were put in C, S would not A’ is true. 
These are contingent conditionals that aren’t in God’s control, because 
they code up how agents would freely act in given circumstances, and 
if the conditionals were up to God, then the agents’ actions wouldn’t be 
free. They are also logically independent of whether S is going to be put 
in C or not.2
“If nothing in the neighborhood of Molinism is true, then God won’t be 
in a position to see when someone is about to do evil and decide to take 
away their free will. But if it is true, then it is at least possible that the true 
conditionals are such that God simply cannot keep some people free while 
preventing others from doing evil. The conditionals may be arranged so 
that, if God were to prevent this person from doing this bit of evil, then 
he would do some other; if God were to prevent him from doing any evil, 
then someone else would do some evil, and so on. Pushing down one 
bump of evil in the rug may make it pop up elsewhere. And, if God is 
particularly unlucky, he may be faced with ‘trans-world depravity’: a situ-
ation where he can only eliminate evil by forcing everyone to act rightly 
in every single circumstance, thus losing the very great good of agents 
freely choosing the right.” The free-will defender then goes on to give a 
complicated modal argument for the possibility of trans-world depravity 
and, presumably, wins this round.3
2. Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense
Let determinism be the thesis that the laws of nature, conjoined with any 
proposition describing the state of the world at any instant, entail any true 
proposition whatsoever.4 Let compatibilism be the thesis that agents can be 
free (and, therefore, morally responsible) even if determinism is true.5 It 
2See Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press), especially chapters 1–2, for a detailed presentation, and the articles in Molinism: 
The Contemporary Debate, ed. Ken Perszyk (Oxford University Press, 2012) for extended 
debate. 
3Plantinga’s “Self-Profile” has a version of the complicated modal argument which does 
not presuppose Molinism.
4See Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 58-65.
5Some philosophers (e.g., John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Con-
trol: A Theory of Moral Responsibility [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]) think 
that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism even if some important kinds of 
freedom are not. I assume here without argument that free will and moral responsibility 
stand or fall together; if you think otherwise, when I talk of “free will” and “compatibilism” 
imagine me to be directly talking about “moral responsibility” and “the compatibility of 
moral responsibility with determinism.”
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is often assumed that the free-will defense is available only to those who 
think that compatibilism is false.
Here’s why. If free will, and thus moral responsibility, is compatible 
with determinism (the argument goes), then God could create free crea-
tures in a deterministic universe. But clearly God gets to choose the laws 
and initial conditions for whatever universe he decides to create, and 
surely there is enough variation in the possible laws and initial condi-
tions for him to create a universe that would contain creatures that met 
compatibilist conditions sufficient for moral responsibility and still never 
did any evil. So if compatibilism were true, God really could have gotten 
the goods—the morally responsible creatures—without allowing any evil, 
and the free-will defense fails.6
Many versions of compatibilism certainly seem to have this result. If, 
like Harry Frankfurt,7 we think that agents act freely if and only if their 
higher-order desires are aligned with their first-order desires in the right 
way, then God needs merely to create a world with creatures determined 
to act rightly while their higher-order desires cohere with their lower-
order ones, and he’s got himself a freedom-filled world where everyone 
always does good.
But not every version of compatibilism has this consequence. In the 
next few sections, I will piece together a compatibilist position according 
to which God may find himself unable to create a world with free crea-
tures who always do the right thing. The picture involves some specific 
compatibilist theses and some specific theistic theses. I do not claim the 
theses are uncontroversial; but they aren’t obvious non-starters, either. I 
won’t be arguing for the theses—I’m not trying to argue that the view 
outlined is true. Rather, I’m outlining a (not obviously hopeless) position 
in logical space to show that an apparent incompatibility—between com-
patibilism and the free will defense—isn’t.
3. Historical Compatibilism
3.1. The Zygote Argument Against Compatibilism
Compatibilists need to respond to a number of anti-compatibilist argu-
ments, such as Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument8 and Derk 
6Compare Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” 44–47; van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 75–76; Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, 
and Free Will in Heaven,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009): 396–417, 399; and James Sen-
nett, “The Free Will Defense and Determinism,” Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991): 340–353, 
346–347. Sennett’s article is in response to Edward Wierenga’s review of Tomberlin and 
van Inwagen, Alvin Plantinga, Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 214–219, where Wierenga claims 
against Plantinga that the free will defense is available to compatibilists. The present 
paper expands on Wierenga’s by describing one model of how a compatibilist free will 
defense might go.
7“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 
5–20.
8Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, chapter 3.
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Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument.9 The compatibilist position I outline here 
is motivated, in part, by a particular response to a third anti-compatibilist 
argument, which Alfred R. Mele calls “The Zygote Argument.”10
The argument begins from a thought experiment concerning two 
possible worlds, wa and wb. Both wa and wb have essentially the same de-
terministic laws, but for one caveat: wb has an effectively omnipotent, dis-
embodied demi-goddess, Diana, not constrained by the laws that govern 
wa.11 In wa an individual, Anna, is conceived at a time t1, robs a bank at a 
time t2, and dies at a time t3. In wb, Betty is conceived at t1, robs a bank at t2, 
and dies at t3. Anna and Betty are intrinsic duplicates of each other, and in 
fact the portions of wa and wb between t1 and t3 are intrinsic duplicates of 
each other, too.
But wb differs from wa. Before t1, the worlds are not intrinsic duplicates. 
In wb, Diana intervenes shortly before t1 to make subtle changes in the en-
vironment ensuring that the just-about-to-come-into-being Betty-zygote 
is an intrinsic duplicate of Anna’s zygote, and that the rest of Betty’s envi-
ronment will be an intrinsic duplicate of Anna’s. That is, well before t1, wb 
isn’t on track to be an intrinsic duplicate of wa at t1. Diana fiddles with the 
world to bring it into line; the intrinsic duplication of the worlds between 
t1 and t3 is thanks to Diana’s intervention. And Diana does this because 
she wants Betty to rob a bank at t2 and—being omniscient—knows that if 
she fiddles with the zygote and the state of the world in this way, and then 
stays out of the picture after Betty comes into being, Betty will be causally 
determined to rob the bank at t2.
That’s the story. Now the argument: Individuals that are intrinsic 
duplicates throughout their lives, living in worlds that are intrinsic du-
plicates throughout those lives, do not differ in any way relevant to free 
will. But Anna and Betty are such individuals, so they don’t have any 
free-will-relevant differences. Clearly, though, Betty didn’t freely rob the 
bank—so neither did Anna.
More precisely:
(1) If worlds w1 and w2 are intrinsic duplicates between t and t', and if 
S1 and S2 are intrinsic duplicates in w1 and w2 whose lives are wholly 
contained within t and t', then for any action they each perform at a 
9Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 112–126.
10Free Will and Luck (Oxford University Press, 2006), 184–195. My presentation will differ 
from Mele’s in several respects, but the essentials are all here.
11This can go one of two ways. The laws of wb might cover Diana as well as everything 
else, but be such that they perfectly match the laws of wa whenever Diana is idle. Then 
we may assume Diana meets conditions a compatibilist thinks sufficient for free will. Or 
Diana may be exempt from wb’s laws, with a libertarian-friendly power to override them. 
Either way, the Diana-free state of wb at a time t, conjoined with the laws of nature and the 
proposition that Diana does not intervene between t and a later time t', entails the Diana-
free state of the world at t'; and if the Diana-free state of wb at t matches the state of wa at t, 
and Diana doesn’t intervene between t and t', then the Diana-free state of wb at t' matches 
the state of wa at t'.
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time between t and t', either S1 and S2 both do it freely or they both 
do it unfreely.
(2) So (given the story) Anna and Betty either both rob the bank freely 
or both rob the bank unfreely.
(3) Betty didn’t freely rob the bank.
(4) So Anna didn’t freely rob the bank, either.
But Anna was just an agent living in a deterministic world. Furthermore, 
for any agent S and action A that S performs at t in a deterministic world 
w, there is a Diana-like possible world that’s an intrinsic duplicate of w 
throughout S’s life and where Diana fiddles with things before S is born 
to ensure that S A’s at t. Repeating the argument for arbitrary A and S gets 
us that no agent in a deterministic world ever acts freely.
3.2. Historical Compatibilism
The Zygote Argument is valid, and there seems no reason to doubt the 
alleged possibility of either wa or wb. (More generally, there’s no reason to 
think there’s anything amiss with the possibility of a Diana-like world for 
each arbitrary agent S and action A.) So any compatibilist who wants to 
resist the argument must deny a premise: either (1) or (3).
The (3)-denier is the hard-line compatibilist, who insists that, Diana’s 
meddling notwithstanding, Betty acts freely.12 The (1)-denier, by contrast, 
denies instead that an agent’s free-will-relevant properties supervene on 
only how the world is during her lifetime.
The most plausible denial of (1) is a form of historical compatibilism. His-
torical compatibilism holds that the property of acting freely is, like the 
property of being a Rembrandt or a genuine one-dollar-bill, a historical 
property. A counterfeit dollar or Rembrandt may be an intrinsic dupli-
cate of a genuine one; what makes it a counterfeit is that it has the wrong 
history. A dollar bill is genuine only if it was produced in the right way 
and under the authority of the US Mint; a Rembrandt is genuine only if 
it was Rembrandt who put its pigment on canvas. According to historical 
compatibilism, whether an action is free or not depends on the history 
that led up to the action.
Historical compatibilism comes in many forms. Some are consistent 
with (1).13 But others aren’t. Historical compatibilists may insist that the 
causal history of an action relevant to its freedom extends very far back in 
12Cf. Michael McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument,” Phi-
losophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 142–159.
13Historical compatibilism has been developed and defended most prominently by Mele 
(Autonomous Agents [Oxford University Press, 1995]), who holds that if an agent S freely 
As, then (very roughly) A didn’t come about in a way that S wouldn’t have wanted it to 
(see Autonomous Agents, 193 for the official proposal). Mele’s official proposal is consistent 
with (1)—and he argues in Free Will and Luck for a hard-line response to the argument—but 
compatibilists may be historical while disagreeing with him on these details.
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time, even predating the existence of the agent, in which case the freedom-
relevant properties of an action won’t supervene on the intrinsic state of 
the world just during the agent’s lifetime.
Why would they say this? Well, first, why do we judge Betty unfree 
in the Zygote scenario? Those sympathetic to incompatibilism will insist 
that it’s because her action was determined. Compatibilists will resist such 
a diagnosis. But they don’t have to look far for another. The events in wb 
don’t unfold “on their own,” governed only by impersonal law and cul-
minating in Betty’s actions. Rather, another agent intentionally engineers 
the whole thing. Diana “makes Betty do it,” deciding what she wants 
Betty to do and engineering both Betty’s intrinsic nature and her environ-
ment from before her birth. Whatever Betty decides, Diana has already 
made the decision for her. Betty’s choice, in addition to being determined, 
is dependent on Diana’s will, and the compatibilist may plausibly think 
that free actions must not be dependent on others in this way. Call this 
view—that free actions can be determined but must not be dependent on 
another’s will—independent compatibilism.
Of course, even determined agents can be influenced by others to some 
degree, so independent compatibilists will need to think hard about what 
sorts of fiddling make actions “dependent” (and hence unfree) and what 
sorts don’t. But, in response to the Zygote Argument, independent com-
patibilists will at a minimum think that if one agent engineers things so 
as to get another to A, and if the first agent knows that her engineering 
will result in the other’s being causally determined to A, the resulting 
A-ing isn’t free. That is, they will endorse
Independence: If S’s arranging matters in way w would result in T’s 
being causally determined to A, and if S knows this and arranges mat-
ters in way w in order to get T to A, then T does not freely A.14
This is consistent with thinking that in a wide variety of other cases deter-
mined agents act freely.
4. A Compatibilist Free Will Defense
Independent compatibilists can use the free-will defense. Here, in broad 
brushstrokes, is the idea. Suppose God decides to create a deterministic 
world with free creatures. Since the world is going to be deterministic, he 
can create a world simply by actualizing some laws and initial conditions. 
We can imagine God considering all the laws and initial conditions to see 
14The thesis can be sharpened in several ways by fleshing out what “would result in” 
and “in order to get T to A” mean. The following (reasonably weak) conditions are good 
enough for our purposes. To say that S’s action (at a time t) would result in T’s being 
determined to A (at a later t') we mean that, necessarily, S’s action would partially cause 
or constitute at t the world’s being in state P and the laws of nature being L, where P and 
L jointly entail that T A’s at t'. By saying that S acts in order to get T to A we mean that S 
decided on the basis of practical deliberation, and that at the end of the deliberation S took 
the fact that the action would result in T’s being causally determined to A at t' as part of a 
decisive reason to so act.
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what kind of world he would get if he chose that law-and-initial-condition 
pairing, and choosing a pairing on the basis of what he sees.
Suppose God looks at laws L and initial conditions I, and notices that, 
were he to actualize L and I, he would get a world where everyone acted 
rightly all the time. Still, given independent compatibilism, if he wants 
morally responsible creatures, he can’t appeal to the fact that an L-and-I 
world is one where everyone acts rightly all the time as a reason to actu-
alize L and I. If he did, he would be arranging matters that would result 
in each individual being causally determined to act rightly, and he would 
knowingly be doing in this order to get them to act rightly, and so they 
would not freely act rightly.
This isn’t to say that God can’t create L and I. Perhaps he can. But if he 
can, it will have to be for some reason other than that, if he did, people 
would act rightly all the time. For all we know, though, God has no such 
reason, in which case if God wants free creatures he’ll have to allow some 
evil to slip in through the cracks.
That, at any rate, is the basic idea. It will be refined a bit in answer to a 
complaint.
4.1. How to Choose
The complaint: Given independent compatibilism, if God decides to create 
a deterministic world with free creatures, he will have no way to provide 
for their well-being. After all, once God decides to create (determined) 
free creatures, he can’t use the moral valence of these creatures’ actions to 
decide what kind of world to make. But then, given the sorts of consider-
ations he can appeal to, for all we’ve said the world God would have most 
reason to create would be one in which people torture babies for sport all 
the time. Balancing God’s providential control with human freedom is 
notoriously difficult, but surely we want a God who can do more than this.
The complaint overstates the case, though. To see why, I’ll sketch an 
Independence-respecting model of divine providence according to which 
God exercises (probabilistic) providential control while creating deter-
mined free creatures. I make no claims as to the model’s accuracy. Since 
we’re in the business of providing a compatibilist defense—of assuming 
(independent) compatibilism and showing the logical compatibility of an 
omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent God with evil—the model’s 
intelligibility is all we need.
First, some background. Notice that God may not need to pick a par-
ticular set of laws and initial conditions in order to create a world. Peter 
van Inwagen has argued that God could create by disjunctive decree: 
he could say “Let there be a cat or mouse,” and if he did, then either a 
cat would come into existence or a mouse would come into existence— 
although there’s no fact about which one it would be.15 Likewise, God 
15“The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God,” in Divine and Human Action, ed. 
T. V. Morris (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 211–235.
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could decide to create a deterministic world with certain features, and 
decree that there be such, leaving the other chips to fall where they may.
If God can do this, then he can presumably also give essentially prob-
abilistic decrees: he can say “Let there be a cat with likelihood .75 or a 
mouse with likelihood .25,” at which point either a cat or a mouse will 
pop into existence, and the objective chance of the decree’s giving rise 
to one or the other is .75 and .25, respectively. If this is right, then God 
could make general “chancy” decrees, and could do so because these 
decrees would increase the likelihood of people acting rightly—and, more 
generally, would increase the expected overall goodness of the world to 
be created—without doing anything that he knows would bring about 
everyone acting rightly all the time.
Now for the model. According to the Bohmian interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, the physical world consists ultimately of two separate 
components: (i) a wavefunction, and (ii) positions of point-sized particles. 
The wavefunction can be represented by a function from possible con-
figurations of particles to complex numbers. It evolves deterministically, 
and what it’s like at later times is determined entirely by what it’s like at 
earlier times. The positions of the particles do not affect the wavefunction 
or its evolution. But the wavefunction affects the positions of the particles: 
a particle’s position at a given time, plus how the wavefunction is at that 
time, tells the particles how to move. The overall system is deterministic: 
the state of the wavefunction at a given time, combined with the precise 
configuration of particles at that time, entails (via the laws) the state of the 
wavefunction and precise configuration of particles at any later time.
Any wavefunction is compatible with any configuration of particles.16 
Knowledge of the exact location of the particles plus the state of the wave-
function at a time would allow a Laplacian demon to calculate the exact 
location of the particles and state of the wavefunction at any later time.
We can’t know both the exact location of the particles and the state of 
the wavefunction at a given time. But, on the Bohmian picture, that’s not 
thanks to any deep metaphysical spookiness, but just because any attempt 
to measure the exact location of particles corresponds to a shift in the 
wavefunction. An analysis of what we’d have to do to measure particle 
positions and wavefunction-states shows us that, when we find out where 
the particles are, we lose information about how the wavefunction is, and 
when we find out how the wavefunction is we lose information about 
where the particles are. We can’t simultaneously track both the positions 
of particles and the state of the wavefunction. That’s no problem for God 
or a Laplacian demon, who can know these locations “directly,” indepen-
dent of measurement.
16Well, more or less, keeping in mind that the wavefunction’s dimensionality must mesh 
with the number of particles. Note also that the theory is non-relativistic, so we’re here 
imagining God creating non-relativistic worlds. See Tim Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality 
and Relativity (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) for discussion of the relevant issues.
134 Faith and Philosophy
Suppose a Laplacian demon knows the state of the wavefunction at 
a time t but, rather than knowing the precise configurations of the par-
ticles at t, only knows the probability of each possible configuration. This 
demon won’t be able to figure out which configurations the particles will 
have at each later time, but he will be able to figure out the probabilities of 
each configuration at each later time.
What goes for the Laplacian demon goes for God. If God knows what 
the wavefunction is initially like, and if God knows how likely each initial 
configuration of particles is, he will know how likely each subsequent 
configuration of particles is, too. And so if God decrees “Let there be a 
Bohmian world with thus-and-so initial wavefunction, and with prob-
abilities of initial particle distributions being like so,” he will know how 
likely each possible future will be given that decree.
What probability distribution should he use? In order to use the laws to 
figure out the later probabilities, the initial probabilities need to follow the 
“Born rule”: for a given initial wavefunction ψ, the probability of each con-
figuration c should be |ψ(c)|2. Such a decree would explain why quantum 
mechanics’ probabilistic predictions pan out so well.17 Let a decree of a 
wavefunction ψ and some initial configuration c or other with probability 
|ψ(c)|2 be called ψ’s characteristic decree.
Since individuals’ actions supervene on the configurations of particles, 
God can use this trick to exercise some providential control while issuing 
a decree which leaves open his determined creatures’ choices. God can 
examine each initial wavefunction and see how likely it would be that his 
creatures choose the right were he to issue the characteristic decree for 
that wavefunction. He can use this information to rank wavefunctions 
as to how likely it is that he’ll get a good world from their characteristic 
decrees, how likely he’ll get a bad one, and so on, to determine which 
decree would best maximize the expected goodness of his creation. And 
he can then issue this decree. Nowhere in that process does he arrange 
matters in such a way as to determine that everyone acts rightly in order 
to get them to, so Independence presents no bar to such a process getting 
him free creatures.
4.2. The Atheist Objects
The atheist objected to the original free will defense on the grounds that 
God could know in advance how people would (freely) act in a given cir-
cumstance and take their free will away just when they were about to act 
wrongly. The atheist has a similar objection to the compatibilist free-will 
17See e.g., Craig Callendar, “The Emergence and Interpretation of Probability in 
Bohmian Mechanics,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2007): 351–370 
for a discussion of how this works and related issues. Callander also there compares the 
Bohmian picture of probabilities with that of statistical mechanics, another deterministic 
physical theory. Note that we could adapt the present model of divine providence for use 
with statistical mechanics rather than Bohmian mechanics by replacing wavefunctions 
with thermodynamic states and the Born-rule based decree with one based on David 
Albert’s past hypothesis (Time and Chance [Harvard University Press, 2003]).
COMPATIBILISM AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE 135
defense spelled out here. Sticking with the Bohmian model of divine cre-
ation outlined above, the objection comes in two forms.
In the first form, the atheist says, “I’ll grant that, if God decrees ‘Let 
A occur with probability p or B occur with probability q,’ then either A 
occurs with probability p or B occurs with probability q. But furthermore, 
God knows which one will occur if he issues such a decree. Now, at least 
many wavefunctions will have non-zero probability of everyone acting 
rightly all the time. Why doesn’t he pick one, ψ, where he knows that, if 
he issues ψ’s characteristic decree, the world he’ll get is the one where 
everyone in fact acts rightly all the time?”
The independent compatibilist might respond to the atheist as follows: 
“If God were to do that, then he would be issuing a decree because he 
knows it will get him people determined to act rightly all the time, and 
he’ll be doing that in order to get people to act rightly all the time, and 
so by Independence those people won’t be morally responsible for acting 
rightly all the time. Even if God knows which conditionals of the form ‘if 
I issue ψ’s characteristic decree, everyone will always act rightly’ are true, 
if he’s trying to get free but determined creatures, he cannot appeal to this 
knowledge in deciding what to do.”
This response seems right to me. There is a second potential line of 
response as well. The atheist’s objection to the original free will defense 
flirted with Molinism—the view that for every possible circumstance C, 
agent S, and action A, exactly one of “If S were put in circumstance C, he 
would A” and “If S were put in circumstance C, he would not A” is true, 
God knows which it is, and God can use this knowledge in deciding what 
to do. His objection now presupposes another Molinist-esque thesis: the 
view that, for every possible probabilistic decree D and possible outcome 
O of D, exactly one of “If God decreed D, O would occur” and “If God 
decreed D, O would not occur” is true, God knows which it is, and God 
can use this knowledge in deciding what to do.
If the Molinist-esque presupposition is false, then the atheist’s proposal 
makes no sense. But even if it is true, we have no reason to suppose that 
any wavefunction’s characteristic decree would result in a world where 
people act rightly all the time. It may be that, through no fault of God’s, 
no conditional of the form “If God were to issue ψ’s characteristic decree, 
everyone would act rightly all the time” is true.
So much for the first form of the objection. But the atheist has a second, 
smaller-scale objection. “Suppose God issues some wavefunction’s 
characteristic decree,” he says. “Then, as the world unfolds, he sees that 
Herman is about to perform a heinous crime. Why can’t God intervene 
and take Herman’s free will away just before the crime is committed? 
And why can’t God repeat this process, leaving people’s free will intact 
whenever they’re about to act rightly, but removing it when they’re about 
to act wrongly?”
Two initial questions before responding to the atheist. First, what 
would it be on the Bohmian model for Herman to be about to commit a 
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heinous crime? Presumably it would be for the particle configuration, as 
driven by the wavefunction, to be about to evolve into one that constitutes 
Herman committing the crime.
Second, what would it be for God to intervene and take away Herman’s 
free will with respect to this act? Presumably, it would be for God to modify 
the world so as to lead to Herman’s not committing the crime, while leaving 
as much else intact as he could. The most natural way to do this would be 
to leave the wavefunction alone and change the particle configuration just 
a little bit, so as to shift it from a configuration that the wavefunction is 
driving towards a crime-committing Herman to one that the wavefunction 
is driving towards a non-crime-committing Herman. (It might be enough, 
for instance, to move one particle in the configuration just a little to the left.) 
If he does this, of course, thanks to Independence, Herman will not be free 
with respect to not committing the crime; but that was in the cards anyway, 
since the atheist is having God take away Herman’s freedom for the sake 
of crime-avoidance.
There will generally be multiple ways God could change the particle 
configurations to keep Herman from committing the crime. God could, 
in principle, evaluate each such way to determine the one with the best 
overall outcome, not just for Herman’s behavior but for the subsequent 
world as a whole. But if he chooses some particular configuration because 
it would lead to others acting rightly down the road, then that choice 
would take away the freedom of those others. Since he’s trying to surgi-
cally remove Herman’s freedom while leaving others’ intact, God’s best 
bet is to again look at the possibilites, make some expected overall good-
ness calculations, and say “Let the particle configuration switch to one of 
those, with thus-and-so probabilities.” Call such a decree a switching decree.
God can indeed make switching decrees, and so can indeed surgically 
remove Herman’s free will shortly before he would otherwise commit the 
crime. But in order to undermine the compatibilist’s free will defense, the 
atheist has to think that God can make switching decrees in a way that 
will lead to everyone acting rightly all the time. And we have no reason 
to think that God can do that—at least, not without taking away everyone’s 
free will.
Suppose that, to keep Herman from his crime, God issues a switching 
decree D. It may be that the result of D is to move the particles in such 
a way that someone else, who was previously on track to act rightly, is 
now lined up to do wrongly. Of course, God can intervene again; but such 
an intervention may lead to yet someone else doing wrongly, and so on 
and so forth. In fact, the Bohmian God may be in a situation precisely 
analogous to the Molinist God the theist described in the first section: 
God may simply be dealt conditionals about what would happen given 
each possible probabilistic decree on which there is simply no pattern 
of decree-issuing that leads to a world with (some) free creatures where 
ever yone acts rightly all the time.
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5. Concluson
Despite appearances, merely being a compatibilist does not put the free 
will defense beyond reach. (For that matter, merely being a fan of the 
free will defense does not put compatibilism beyond reach, either.) I have 
outlined one sort of strategy for a compatibilist free-will defense, and for 
all I know there may be others.
The strategy outlined here is not for everyone. Those independently 
convinced of incompatibilism, or of certain compatibilist views inconsis-
tent with Independence, or of certain pictures of divine providence, may 
find little to their liking. Those with other commitments may be more 
attracted to the defense. And those still developing their commitments 
can at least do so knowing that a compatibilist free will defense is on 
the table.18
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